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Abstract—We revisit in this paper the well-studied Hawk
and Dove game within a dynamic framework. A non-standard
evolutionary game approach is taken, in which the starting point
of the modelling is the dynamic evolution of the populations as a
function of the strategies used, instead of a fitness based model (in
which the fitness functions determine the evolution). This work
is motivated by the discussion in the book of Thomas L. Vincent
co-authored with J. Brown [4] in which they raise (on page 73)
the puzzling question of whom should one consider to be the
players: the individuals or the populations?
I. INTRODUCTION
Competition between Hawks and Doves has been used as
one of the basic models for the evolution of some feature
(aggressiveness in our case) within a population. The frame-
work in which this model was studied the most is the one
of evolutionary games, a branch of game theory developed
by J. Maynard Smith [2]. This paradigm specializes in large
populations in which the fraction of the different behaviours
change as a result of large number of local pairwise inter-
actions, i.e. interactions between randomly chosen pairs of
individuals. Central in evolutionary games is the concept of
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS), which is a distribution
of (deterministic or mixed) actions such that if used, the
population is immune to penetration of mutations. This notion
is stronger than that of Nash equilibrium as ESS is robust
against a deviation of a whole fraction of the population where
as the Nash equilibrium is defined with respect to possible
deviations of a single player [4]. A second basic element in the
theory of evolutionary games is that of the replicator dynamics,
which provides the dynamic evolution of the ratio of the
population that uses each action. There are various variants of
the replicator dynamics, each giving distinct trajectories, that
can be justified under appropriate conditions. We note that the
ESS concept does not rely on how the dynamics are modelled,
and therefore the modelling phase in evolutionary games often
restricts to describing the local interactions between players
along with the possible related fitness, and does not include
global dynamic aspects of the populations.
In this paper, we propose a new modelling with several
features that differs from the standard modelling of the Hawk
and Dove game.
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• First, instead of defining a fitness (that each individual
would optimize and then study the dynamics using some
replicator dynamics), we start by including the dynamics
of the population into the model and into the decision
process.
• We supply each individual with an energy state and define
how the ”decision” of being aggressive or peaceful affect
the transitions between the energy states. This decision
is taken at birth genetically and it can’t be changed
(framework of an evolutionary game in [3]).
• Our approach differs from previous ones (where the
global state is composed of the ”fractions” of the popu-
lation that adopt each type of behaviour) by proposing a
model where the expected outcome of an interaction is
determined not just by the fractions of the population in
different states (against a randomly selected individual).
• We chose to focus on modelling of the whole population
as players having a common objective. In this case, the
rate of population growth depends on the number of
individuals with a higher energy level. We do not assume
that an individual inherits the behaviour of its parent.
Our goal here is to characterize the equilibrium policies as
a function of the system parameters.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sec. II, we
present the model and afterwards we focus on the population
size dynamics. In Sec.III, we describe the evolutionary game
and investigate the existence of ESS. We give explicit results
(Sec. IV), on conditions for having pure or mixed equilibria.
Finally, Sec. V gives a discussion on the framework of the
paper. We conclude the paper in Sec. VI. Due to space
limitations, all the proofs will be incorporated in the final
version of the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a modified Hawk and Dove game with state
dependent actions. The action taken by each individual de-
pends on his local (individual) state. This state represents the
energy like in [1]. We consider a three state model.
• In the highest state (denoted state 2 hereafter), an indi-
vidual can act either as a Hawk (H) or a Dove (D) in
order to get the resource. This action is decided at the
birth of each individual. This means that each individual
in state 2 acts either as H or D during all his life.
• In the intermediate state (denoted state 1), the only
possible action is called W as an individual is weak.
Every individual starts his life in this state.
• The last state corresponds to a dead individual.
Therefore, the life of an individual is governed by a three-
state Markov process in which the transition rates depend on
the action of the individual, genetically defined at his birth,
and also the population profile and size.
The main difference with the model described in [1] is that
the authors do not consider birth of individuals but penalties.
Also, MacNamara et al. consider an infinite population of
individuals but, in our model, we consider a finite number
of individuals evolving depending on interactions.
A. Interactions
In the dynamic of the system, there are two possible events
for an individual: meeting a resource with a rate α or losing
energy (fall down to a lower individual state). An individual
loses energy if he does not find any resource during a random
amount of time. This time follows an exponential distribution
with a parameter that depends on his action. If an individual
plays Dove (resp. Hawk, Weak), this rate is γd (resp. γh, γ1).
If an individual gets a resource, then its local state goes from 1
to 2 (if the individual was in the intermediate state) or stay in
state 2. An individual can lose energy by competing a resource
with another individual and then his local state goes down from
2 to 1.
We have several scenarios of interactions between different
individuals which leads to different transitions:
• If two Weak meet, then one of the two players gets the
resource.
• If two Hawks meet, then one of the two gets the resource
but the other loses energy.
• If a Dove/Weak meets a Hawk, the Hawk gets the
resource and, the Dove/Weak is injured and falls down
to the intermediate state.
• If a Dove meets a Weak, then the Dove gets the resource
and there is no energy loss for both.
• If two Dove meet, then one of the two gets the resource
and there is no energy loss for both.
B. Growth Rate Dynamics of Population Size
The originality of our approach consists in the size of the
population which is assumed to evolve in time. We have two
dynamics in our system: the population dynamics and the
strategy dynamics.
Individuals are assumed to be born in the intermediate state
with a rate λ. Only individuals in the highest state can give
birth. Thus, the global birth rate is proportional to the number
of individuals in the highest state. The individuals compete
for resources by playing actions which depends on their local
state. We assume that for each birth, there is a probability β
that the new born individual does not follow the parents genes.
It means that a Dove can give birth to a Hawk and conversely.
Otherwise, a Dove (resp. a Hawk) gives birth to a Dove (resp.
a Hawk). Each new undefined child chooses with probability
u to be a Hawk for all his life.
We denote by XH1 (t) (resp. X
H
2 (t)) the number of Hawk at
time t in state 1 (resp. 2). We have the same notations XD1 (t)
and XD2 (t) for the Doves. We denote by X
H(t) (resp. XD(t))
the total number of Hawks (resp. Doves) at time t. We note
also by X1(t) (resp. X2(t)) the total number of individuals in
state 1 (resp. in state 2) at time t.
1) Hawk Population: We have the following differential
equations for the dynamic of the Hawk population (individuals
in state 1 and individuals in state 2).
X˙H1 (t) = (1− β)λhXH2 (t) + uβ(λhXH2 (t) + λdXD2 (t))
+α(1−q(X))2 X
H
2 (t)
XH2 (t)
X + γhX
H
2 (t)
−γ1XH1 (t)− αq(X)XH1 (t)
−α(1− q(t)) 12XH1 (t)X
H
1 (t)+X
D
1 (t)
X .
X˙H2 (t) = αq(X)X
H
1 (t) +
α(1−q(X))
2 X
H
1 (t)
XH1 (t)+X
D
1 (t)
X
−α(1−q(X))2 XH2 (t)X
H
2 (t)
X − γhXH2 (t).
(1)
We describe this process by:
• (1− β)λhXH2 (t): the total Hawk birth rate proportional
to the number of Hawk in state 2 (with probability (1−β)
the new individual will be also a Hawk),
• uβ(λhXH2 (t) + λdX
D
2 (t)): with a probability β, a new
individual will not necessary follow his parents and, with
probability u, he will act as an Hawk,
• α(1−q(X))2 X
H
2 (t)
XH2 (t)
XH1 (t)+X
H
2 (t)+X
D
1 (t)+X
D
2 (t)
: when two
Hawks fight for the resource, one of the two wins and
the loser gets down to the intermediate state,
• γhXH2 (t): the rate that a Hawk in state 2 does not find
resources,
• γ1XH1 (t): a Hawk in state 1 does not find a resource and
dies.
• αq(X)XH1 (t): when a Weak Hawk meets alone a re-
source, he gets it and gets up to the highest state,
• α(1−q(X)) 12XH1 (t) X
H
1 (t)+X
D
1 (t)
XH1 (t)+X
H
2 (t)+X
D
1 (t)+X
D
2 (t)
: when a
Weak meets another Weak (Hawk or Dove) individual,
one of the two gets the resource and gets up to the
intermediate state.
We have the following relation:
X˙H1 (t) + X˙
H
2 (t) = 0,
which becomes:
(1− β)λhXH2 (t) + uβ(λhXH2 (t) + λdXD2 (t)) = γ1XH1 (t).
2) Dove Population: We have the following differential
equations for the dynamic of the Hawk population (individuals
in state 1 and individuals in state 2).
X˙D1 (t) = (1− β)λdXD2 (t)
+(1− u)β(λhXH2 (t) + λdXD2 (t))
+α(1− q(X))XD2 (t)X
H
2 (t)
X + γdX
D
2 (t)
−γ1XD1 (t)− αq(X)XD1 (t)
−α(1− q(X)) 12XD1 (t)X
H
1 (t)+X
D
1 (t)
X .
X˙D2 (t) = αq(X)X
D
1 (t)
+α(1− q(X)) 12XD1 (t)X
H
1 (t)+X
D
1 (t)
X
−α(1− q(X))XD2 (t)X
H
2 (t)
X − γdXD2 (t).
(2)
We have the following relation:
X˙D1 (t) + X˙
D
2 (t) = 0,
which becomes:
(1−β)λdXD2 (t)+(1−u)β(λhXH2 (t)+λdXD2 (t)) = γ1XD1 (t).
We denote by X˜(u) = X˜H1 (u)+X˜
H
2 (u)+X˜
D
1 (u)+X˜
D
2 (u)
the stationary regime, i.e., the solution to the system composed
of the four equations: X˙H1 = 0; X˙
H
2 = 0; X˙
D
1 = 0 and X˙
D
2 =
0. An analytical solution cannot be found in general, i.e., for
all u ∈ [0, 1]. However, for u ∈ {0, 1}, this solution will be
used to characterize the pure ESS states of the population in
the following sections.
C. Probability of interactions
Assume that with a probability q an individual meets a
resource alone. Then, the individual which is in the interme-
diate state, increases his energy and his local state becomes
the highest one (state 2). This probability depends on the
population size X . We assume that each individual has an
opportunity to find an idle resource with a high probability.
Hence, when the population size is 1+X , this individual is in
competition with X other individuals and the probability that
he is alone is given by:
q(X) =
1
1 +X
,
where X = XH1 +X
D
1 +X
H
2 +X
D
2 is the total size of the
population.
D. Individual transition rates
Each individual is controlled by a three state Markov
process. There is one process for each type of individual, i.e.
one for Hawk and one for Dove. The transition rates between
the states depend on the action of the individual which can
be either Hawk or Dove; and also on the population profile
u′ (the proportion of Hawk in the population). We note that
each individual is born in the state 1. Let ri,j(a, u′) is the
transition rate from state i to state j depending on the action
a ∈ {D,H}.
If the individual is an Hawk, then the transition rates are:
• from 1 to 0, the rate is r1,0(H,u′) := γ1,
• from 1 to 2, the rate is r1,2(H,u′) := αq(X) + α(1 −
q(X)) 12
X˜1(u
′)
X˜(u′)
,
• from 2 to 1, the rate is r2,1(H,u′) :=
α(1−q(X))
2
X˜H2 (u
′)
X˜(u′)
+
γh.
If an individual is a Dove, then its transition rates are:
• from 1 to 0, the rate is r1,0(D,u′) := γ1,
• from 1 to 2, the rate is r1,2(D,u′) := αq(X) + α(1 −
q(X)) 12
X˜1(u
′)
X˜(u′)
,
• from 2 to 1, the rate is r2,1(D,u′) := α(1 −
q(X))
X˜H2 (u
′)
X˜(u′)
+ γd.
The transition matrix of this Markov process is given by:
A(a, u′) =
 0 0 0γ1 −γ1 − r1,2(a, u′) r1,2(a, u′)
0 r2,1(a, u
′) −r2,1(a, u′)

Note that those transitions are equal even for a Dove and
a Hawk, except the ones from the state 2 to the state 1. It
means that r1,2(a, u′) = r1,2(u′). This is obvious as the week
individuals (individuals in state 1) behave similarly if it is a
Hawk or a Dove.
III. FITNESS AND FORMULATION OF THE GAME
A. Individual Fitness
The control parameter u determines the strategy of an
individual. This parameter represents the probability for an
individual to play Hawk in the highest state. We define by
J(a, u′) the reward of an individual playing strategy a ∈
{H,D} against the population profile u′ (it means that u′
is the proportion of Hawks in the population). Then we have
u′ =
X˜H
X˜
.
Each individual wants to maximize his expected time spent
in state 2, as it is highly related to the average number of
offspring of an individual. We denote by Zt the state of a
tagged individual at time t. The fitness of this individual taking
action a is expressed by:
J(a, u′) = IEa,u′
∫ ∞
0
1l{Zt=2}dt =
∫ ∞
0
pt(a, u
′)dt,(3)
where pt(a, u′) = IPa,u′(Zt = 2|Z0 = 1). Since the expected
number of births per individual is proportional to the time it
spends in state 2, the fitness as we defined it, has the direct
meaning of expected number of offspring of an individual.
Proposition 1: For all time t, the fitness of an individual
playing action a ∈ {H,D} against a population profile u′ is
given by:
J(a, u′) =
r1,2(a, u
′)
γ1r2,1(a, u′)
.
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we study the different possible structures
of equilibria and under what conditions on the system’s
parameters they are obtained.
Fig. 1. Pure ESS as functions of γh and γd.
A. Pure equilibria
We first look at the existence of a pure equilibrium for our
game. We have the two possible cases:
1) D is a pure equilibrium if and only if J(0, 0) > J(1, 0).
2) H is a pure equilibrium if and only if J(1, 1) > J(0, 1).
Proposition 2: The strategy D is an ESS if and only if the
expected remaining time in any state without getting resource
of an individual playing ”Dove”, is strictly higher than the
expected remaining time he gets playing ”Hawk”: 1γd >
1
γh
.
Therefore, Dove is a pure ESS when the average amount of
time an individual playing Dove can stay in state 2 without
any new resource is higher than the same time characteristic
to a Hawk individual. This result is somehow intuitive if we
consider that an individual playing Hawk is more aggressive
and may need more resources to survive.
Let us now consider the case where one individual is faced
to a population of Hawk. In this case, we look for sufficient
conditions on the model parameters that ensure a pure Hawk
ESS.
Proposition 3: The strategy H is an ESS if and only if one
of the following condition is met:
[C1] αλh−γ1γh
αγ21+2γ1γh(γh+γ1)−αλ2h
< 0 and γd > γh,
[C2] αλh−γ1γh
αγ21+2γ1γh(γh+γ1)−αλ2h
≥ 0 and
γd > γh
(
1 +
γ21
(γ1+λh)2
)
− αγ1λh(γ1+λh)2 .
The results in the previous propositions are illustrated in
Fig. 1. In the following, we study the existence of a mixed
ESS.
B. Mixed equilibria
In order to find a mixed ESS u∗, we have to solve the
maximization problem:
u∗ = arg max
u∈[0,1]
J(u, u∗).
This optimization is equivalent to finding the probability u∗
such that: ∫ ∞
0
pt(1, u
∗)dt =
∫ ∞
0
pt(0, u
∗)dt.
Proposition 4: The mixed equilibrium u∗ is solution of the
following equation:
X˜H2 (u
∗)
1 + X˜(u∗)
=
2(γh − γd)
α
.
This equilibrium exists if γh − α2 < γd < γh.
V. DISCUSSION
One can say that our model is not a real evolutionary game
as all players have a common objective function. However,
in such a game, a globally optimal solution is clearly a Nash
equilibrium. It is in fact a strong equilibrium (the latter is
defined as a multi-strategy for which no subset S of players
can benefit if they all deviate). The converse is not true. For
example, consider a game with two players, each having the
compact interval [0, 1] as the strategy set, and a common utility
given as the product of their actions. In this case, there are
exactly two equilibria: {0, 0} and {1, 1}. But only the latter
one is globally optimal.
Now, consider a game where all players have common
objectives. Here, a globally optimal solution need not be
an ESS. In fact, an ESS may not exist and it might be
advantageous to use the notion of ESS Set instead (see [5]). In
our model, the fitness is the same for all individuals. However,
the actions have an important influence on the birth rates and,
therefore, on the dynamic of each sub-population.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have revisited the Hawk and Dove evo-
lutionary game. Our objective was to address the puzzling
question raised in [4, p.73]. To this aim, we chose a framework
which is between the two possibilities stated in the abstract:
each individual is a player but the fitness of all players is the
same (and does not depend on their type), i.e., all individuals
have common goal. This allowed us to make use of the
evolutionary game framework in which each individual is a
player, rather than to consider the whole population as a single
player.
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